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I. INTRODUCTION
The subject of this Essay is inspection and enforcement strategies in
labor and employment law, with particular focus on the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). I approach the subject from
two somewhat different perspectives, having been a private practitioner
representing clients being investigated and prosecuted by OSHA, and
having also served as Solicitor of Labor, with OSHA as one of my clients
and with responsibility myself for prosecuting OSHA cases.
OSHA and the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) are
both agencies within the Labor Department represented by the Solicitor's
Office in rulemaking and litigation. Other Labor Department agencies
include the Wage and Hour Division, which enforces the minimum wage
and overtime laws, and the Employee Benefits Security Administration,
which is responsible for the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA). These and all the other agencies in the Labor Department are
represented by the Solicitor's Office.
Although all of these agencies are housed in a single cabinet
department and report to one cabinet secretary, there is considerable variety
in how they discharge their investigative and enforcement responsibilities.
A good example is what could be called the "intensity" of workplace
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inspections by MSHA and OSHA; these two inspection regimes are in a
sense opposites of one another, with the distinctive character of each
presenting certain challenges to enforcement by the agency.
MSHA is required by statute to inspect every underground mine four
times per year.' Presumably such frequent inspection causes some
increased compliance with the law. But it also presents certain challenges
to the agency: When a dangerous condition at a mine causes serious injury
or death, MSHA will have been there recently. When it was there, what
did it find? If it did not find the hazard, why not? If it did find the hazard,
what did it do to address it and was that enough? For MSHA to identify a
violation in a post-accident investigation, is for the agency to raise the
possibility that it erred. That sort of admission can be difficult, and in this
sense the high "intensity" of MSHA inspections can be among the
challenges that confront that agency.
In the case of OSHA, one of its greatest challenges is the opposite of
MSHA's-whereas MSHA inspects every underground mine four times a
year, OSHA estimates it would take it 167 years to inspect every worksite
just once.2 This makes it critical that OSHA choose its inspections well, so
that it is going to places that are hazardous, and where the hazards are of a
type the government is positioned to address.
II. MAXIMIZING ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES
The issue of targeting inspections is part of a broader question that
was of particular interest to me as Solicitor: How to maximize scarce
enforcement resources? Let me suggest a few guideposts.
First, one enforcement priority should be assuring that the
enforcement process itself is working. Call it clearing the arteries. It is for
this reason that the government should prosecute aggressively those who
disdain the rule of law and the legal process itself. If there are not severe
consequences for improperly disregarding orders of OSHA and orders of
the court, all other enforcement efforts are diminished. It is for this reason
that as Solicitor-with the help of career lawyers in Chicago and
Washington, D.C.-I instituted a policy of increased use of section 11 (b) of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act).3 That section permits
a final order of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission to
be entered as an order of a federal court of appeals. Once this essentially
ministerial step is taken, a company that violates the order is subject not
1. 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (2000).
2. Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao, Speech to the Voluntary Protection Program
Participants Association (Aug. 27, 2001), available at http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/
speeches/20010827_VPPA.htm.
3. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000).
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only to possible prosecution under the OSH Act, but to contempt of court
proceedings in the court of appeals as well. In the relatively few instances
where 11 (b) contempt procedures have been used in the past, appreciable
fines have been levied by the courts, sometimes far in excess of the fines
authorized for violation of the OSH Act itself. It was in light of this that
we directed increased use of section 11 (b).
A second and related enforcement priority in a world of limited
resources is ensuring that auxiliary means of achieving compliance are
open, functioning, and respected. Shortly after I became Solicitor, the
Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (MSH Review Commission)
issued a decision highly critical of the Department of Labor's handling of
an MSHA whistleblower case, in which it had taken the Solicitor's Office
and MSHA more than eighteen months to seek temporary reinstatement of
the complainant.4 When those who make good faith safety and health
complaints are subject to retaliation, it erodes an important source of
government information on potential violations of the law. The
government, in turn, is forced to place greater reliance on less reliable
sources, such as the random inspection schemes addressed below.
For this reason, shortly after the MSH Review Commission issued the
decision in the disciplinary proceeding, MSHA Administrator Dave
Lauriski and I established timetables and a monitoring system for the
processing of whistleblower complaints, which resulted in considerably
more expeditious handling of whistleblower complaints in MSHA. For
similar reasons, I supported the career lawyers in the New York regional
solicitor's office in seeking the first-ever preliminary injunction reinstating
an employee in a wage-hour retaliation case.5
III. TARGETING INSPECTIONS
A third means of maximizing enforcement resources is, of course, to
target inspections wisely. As Solicitor, I viewed the inspections performed
by OSHA and the other enforcement agencies in the Department as laying
the groundwork for my office's own efforts; it is principally through
agency inspections that cases are found and developed, and for that reason I
considered it important for the Solicitor's Office to give feedback on areas
where inspection systems could be improved to meet enforcement priorities
and to yield stronger, more significant cases. This is an area in which the
agencies within the Labor Department-perhaps OSHA more than most-
have room to improve.
OSHA conducts inspections on two bases: complaint driven, and so-
4. Disciplinary Proceeding, No. D 2000-1; 24 FMSHRC 28 (Fed. Mine Safety &
Health Review Comm'n Jan. 31, 2002).
5. Bob Port, Sweatshop Backs Down, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Aug. 26, 2002, at 22.
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called "programmed" inspections. Complaint-driven inspections result, of
course, from specific reports of hazardous conditions. Programmed
inspections result from neutral administrative inspection schemes that
target companies for inspection based on characteristics such as their
industry, location, and reported injury rate.
Since 1998, OSHA's principal inspection plan has been its Site-
Specific Targeting (SST) Plan. The plan uses data about injury rates at
specific worksites to target them for inspection-each year: a group of
industries is selected for SST inspection, and then the worksites within
those industries with the highest reported rate of injury are scheduled for
inspection.
The premise of SST is sensible-make the most hazardous worksites
the focus of inspection efforts. In this respect, SST is a significant
departure from prior inspection programs-and, potentially, a significant
improvement. Other inspection programs rely on injury data at the industry
level, but do not have the site-specific injury data that SST employs.
Accordingly, these other inspection regimes randomly target worksites for
inspection within the targeted industry.
SST has been in place long enough to be reviewed and assessed, and
the data indicates that it has not been as effective an enforcement tool as
should be expected. This became clear to me as Solicitor, when I
compared what I called the "success" rate of SST inspections with the
success rates of other inspection programs. What I mean by "success" is
the number of citations per inspection-particularly, limited to serious and
willful violations involving dangerous conditions. The success rate of SST
inspections is not materially different than for other programmed inspection
plans. The data indicates that SST is steering OSHA toward workplaces
with high reported injury rates, but not necessarily workplaces where those
injury rates result from violations of the law.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) reached the same conclusion
regarding SST in a report in November, 2002. "The SST program is
limited in its ability to effectively identify hazardous worksites," the GAO
reported.6 The report went on to say:
[O]ur review of [OSHA's database] as well as interviews with
area office directors indicate that these [poor] outcomes could
result from faulty information that caused OSHA to send
inspectors to worksites that were either not hazardous or that had
6. UNITES STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH,
OSHA CAN STRENGTHEN ENFORCEMENT THROUGH IMPROVED PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 10
(2002) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
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hazards that were outside of OSHA' s control.7
And:
[F]or about 17 percent of worksites on the SST list, inspectors
found no violations. In another 14 percent, inspectors found no
serious violations.
[O]fficials from OSHA's regional and area offices ... expressed
concern about the ability of the SST program to reach those
worksites with hazards that inspectors can address. Over half
stated that the program did not identify a sufficient number of
employers with serious violations to warrant their participation.
For example, at one local office, we were told that 35 percent of
worksites on the list were not cited for a violation!
Now let me acknowledge, as an aside, that there are other ways to
view this matter. For instance, OSHA inspections may be viewed as a sort
of house-call for troubled employers: federally funded corporate consulting
intended less to effect compliance with the law and more to help employers
find ways to address hazards regardless of whether those hazards violate
federal law. Call this approach, "We're the government and we're here to
help." Under this view, it does not matter whether violations are found on
an OSHA inspection, as long as there has been a chance for the government
to reach out and touch an employer.
Another (perhaps related) view is that inspection itself is a form of
enforcement, in the sense that it is an imposition of government power that
causes a company to change its practices even though the law does not
require that it do so. The most notable example of this approach is a 1998
OSHA program called the "Cooperative Compliance Program." Under the
program, employers with high reported injury rates were told they had been
selected for onerous comprehensive "wall-to-wall" inspections. But, they
were advised, we will greatly reduce the likelihood of inspection-and any
inspections that do occur will be relatively benign-if you agree to do a
series of things currently not required by federal law. Under this program,
which was invalidated by the D.C. Circuit, OSHA's inspection authority
was openly used as a form of coercion to prompt employers to do things
that, at the time, OSHA did not have the authority to require.9
7. Id. at 12.
8. Id.
9. Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 208-09 (D.C. Cir.
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The third view of the purpose of inspections-which is my view, the
most common view, and the view that coincides with the Fourth
Amendment-is that they are for investigative and enforcement purposes
only. OSHA has separate consultation and compliance assistance programs
to show employers how to improve workplace safety. But when it comes
uninvited to private property, the government has a right of access only
when it has probable cause to believe that a violation of a law enforceable
by that agency has occurred. In administrative inspection schemes,
probable cause is defined somewhat loosely-but the justification for
government entry remains the search for a prosecutable violation of the
law.
As the GAO Report reflects, one reason OSHA's SST inspection
program has not been particularly successful is that it targets inspections
without regard to whether the injuries at the worksite result from violations
of legal requirements that OSHA enforces.' ° Yet the data that OSHA
accumulates through its SST inspections should enable it to identify the
particular employers that not only have high injury rates, but also have a
high number of injuries attributable to serious legal violations. OSHA is in
a position to take steps to ensure that it inspects these companies more and,
by the same token, that it inspects less frequently those employers that are
not found to be violating the law.
OSHA made some progress in this direction in 2003 with an
"Enhanced Enforcement Program.")] Under that program, when one
facility of a company has a particularly serious incident-such as a fatality
coupled with a high gravity serious violation related to the death, or three
or more high gravity serious violations that are repeat or willful-OSHA
may in that event schedule other facilities of the same company for
inspection. This is a step in the right direction. But OSHA should continue
to look for ways to better target its resources, so that it is inspecting
employers who violate the law more, and is spending less time inspecting
those who comply with the law. This is the sensible way to marshal scarce
government enforcement resources. It also is more respectful of Fourth
Amendment rights.
1999).
10. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 16.
11. Press Release, Occupational Safety & Health Administration, Labor Secretary
Announces Plans to Enhance Enforcement for Employers Who Defy Safety and Health
Regulations (Mar. 11, 2003) available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show-
document?p table=NEWSRELEASES&pid= 10125.
In 2004 OSHA sought public comment on how effectively SST is accomplishing its
goals and ways that it might be improved. 69 Fed. Reg. 25445 (May 6, 2004). At the time
this essay went to press, no changes appear to have been made to the program in response to
comments.
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IV. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT, EMPLOYERS, AND
EMPLOYEES IN ACHIEVING COMPLIANCE
The government does not have the sole-or even primary-role in
furthering occupational safety and health or compliance with the
employments laws generally. Others with those responsibilities include
employers and employees, individually and collectively through their labor
unions. I will conclude with some observations on the interplay of
government, employers, and employees in furthering legal compliance.
Specialists speak of labor law and employment law as distinct
things-labor law is about the right to organize; collective bargaining;
economic weapons (strikes and lockouts); and other matters regulated by
the National Labor Relations Act. Employment law comprises pretty much
everything else, including discrimination law, wage and hour law, and
occupational safety and health.
In the real world, of course, these things are not distinct. Unions are
among the most effective advocates for workplace safety. In unionized
workplaces on a daily basis, unions play an important role in identifying
and addressing occupational hazards. When necessary-and at times when
not necessary-unions contact OSHA to complain and trigger inspections.
So, the question arises, as the government sets its inspection and
enforcement priorities, what consideration should be given the fact of union
representation at a worksite? The following is not intended to be
conclusive, but rather is offered as food for thought and to initiate
discussion.
In a recent article, I observed that federal employment law takes three
different approaches to regulating unionized workplaces.'l The first can be
called the "deferential" approach. An example is Section 3(o) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which permits a company and union to
bargain over the compensability of time that employees spend changing
clothes or washing at the beginning and end of a shift.'3 In a non-union
workplace, that time sometimes has to be compensated. In a unionized
workplace, however, whether to compensate the time is subject to
negotiation.
There are other instances where the law takes a deferential approach
toward union agreements. The FLSA's overtime requirements exempt
employees under collective bargaining agreements that guarantee they will
not work more than 1040 hours in a twenty-six week period.' 4 And OSHA
12. Eugene Scalia, Regulation of Unionized Workplaces, 2 PERSP. ON WORK 17 (2004);
see also Eugene Scalia, Ending Our Anti- Union Federal Employment Policy, 24 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 489 (2001).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 203.3(o) (2000).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 207(b)(1) (2000).
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regulations provide that if a worker's termination for certain types of
whistle-blowing can be arbitrated under a collective-bargaining agreement,
then the agency may defer to the arbitration proceeding and not bring its
own whistleblower case. 5
In at least one instance, though, the law takes a quite different
approach toward union-negotiated agreements-what can be called the
"skeptical" approach. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, Co. in 1974, the
Supreme Court ruled that collective bargaining agreements cannot compel
binding arbitration of discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act.16 The Court has extended this rule to other statutory claims,
including federal wage-hour claims. By contrast, the Court has also ruled
that, individually, employees can enter binding pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate statutory claims. 7 The way the law stands in most federal circuits,
then, an individual employee's agreement to arbitrate a statutory claim is
enforceable, but if employees agree collectively through their union to
binding arbitration of statutory claims, that is non-enforceable. In this
instance, the union agreement is treated more skeptically than the
individual agreement.
The third approach toward union-negotiated arrangements can be
called the "neutral" approach. This treats terms negotiated with unions the
same as terms established by other means: they do not get deference, but
nor are they treated skeptically. This is the most common approach in the
law. So, for instance, while the FLSA gives some deference to company-
union agreements regarding the compensability of clothes-changing time,
union and non-union workplaces are treated the same for other preparatory
activities at work, such as sharpening tools or inspecting equipment.
This neutral approach toward union-negotiated agreements was in the
background of the Supreme Court's decision in US Airways, Inc. v.
Barnett."' Plaintiff Barnett sought to be placed in a light-duty position as
an accommodation for his bad back.' 9 Other, more senior workers had a
prior claim to the position under the company's seniority system; the
question was whether a "reasonable accommodation" under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) can require deviating from a seniority
system. 20 The Supreme Court ruled that ordinarily seniority systems do not
yield to the ADA's reasonable accommodation obligation.2' If the
employer has allowed exceptions to its seniority system in the past for
15. 29 C.F.R. § 1978.112 (2003).
16. 415 U.S. 36, 55 (1974).
17. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991).
18. 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
19. Id. at 394.
20. Id. at 395-96.
21. Id. at 403-06.
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other reasons, however, an exception for purposes of the ADA may be
required too.
22
The seniority system in Barnett was company-imposed. The AFL-
CIO filed an amicus brief urging the Court to recognize that union-
negotiated seniority systems are due more deference under the ADA than
company-imposed systems.23 The Court did not draw that distinction,
although Justice O'Connor hinted at it in a concurring opinion.24
V. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION
A case can be made for each of the three approaches outlined above. I
admit to some sympathy for the deferential approach, which recognizes the
regulatory regime established by the National Labor Relations Act as, to
some extent, an alterative means of achieving much the same thing as laws
directly regulating the employment relationship, such as the OSH Act, the
wage-hour laws, and the Family and Medical Leave Act. The laws
protecting the right to organize and bargain are intended to empower
employees to improve wages, benefits, and workplace safety for
themselves; when employees effectively collaborate to that end, the
deferential approach says, the need for intervention of federal law is some
degree less than in workplaces where workers have not organized. That
being the case, the deferential approach asks, why not give some deference
to unions if they choose to negotiate terms and conditions slightly different
than those provided by federal law?
The case for the neutral approach is just that-the approach is neutral,
applying the law equally to union and non-union companies. This avoids
the competitive advantage that unionized companies might have over non-
union firms if they could use the deferential approach to contract around
costly employment rules. From the employee's perspective, the neutral
approach guarantees unionized employees the same statutory entitlements
as non-union workers. They cannot be pressured to bargain-away statutory
rights that, for non-union workers, are non-negotiable.
Finally, the skeptical approach recognizes that unions sometimes
sacrifice individual rights for collective benefits. When a statute gives a
right to an individual, this approach says, co-workers should not be able to
bargain that right away for their own benefit.
In offering these thoughts, it is not my intent to make a conclusive
case for the deferential approach toward regulating unionized workplaces,
or any of the other approaches. What I would suggest, however, is that this
22. Id. at 405-06.
23. Brief of Amici Curiae American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations, USAirways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (No. 00-1250).
24. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 408.
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area appears ripe for research, discussion, and debate. In that discussion
and debate, I would suggest, the following are among the relevant
questions:
" Do Congress, the courts, and federal regulatory agencies
currently have a coherent system for selecting among the
deferential, skeptical, and neutral approaches when drafting,
interpreting, and enforcing laws that regulate the terms and
conditions of employment?
" What are the pros and cons of the different approaches? Are
there identifiable circumstances in which one or another of
the approaches is particularly appropriate?
" If use of the deferential approach were increased, what would
be the effect on union organization rates and on the terms and
conditions of unionized workers' employment?
* If some increased use of the deferential approach is
appropriate, what form should that deference take: Full
exemption of unionized companies from certain requirements?
Exemption when a provision of a collective-bargaining
agreement conflicts with otherwise applicable law?
Exemption only when expressly provided for in the
agreement? More a procedural than substantive exemption,
that is, increased deference by investigative agencies, federal
prosecutors, and the courts to dispute-resolution mechanisms
provided in collective-bargaining agreements?
Whatever the answers to these questions, by considering and debating
them we will improve our understanding of the best means to deploy
government inspection and enforcement resources to achieve compliance
with the law.
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